Paul O'Connor:

Good morning all and welcome to the Netwealth Portfolio Construction Podcast. I'm Paul O'Connor and I'm the head of strategy and development for the investment options offered by Netwealth. Recently, we've worked closely with Income Asset Management or IAM, to make available to our wholesale clients a small parcel bond service short. The direct bond market has historically been the domain of institutional investors due to the high minimum trade sizes to purchase a bond and retail investors have had limited access to bonds on only rarely on listed securities exchanges.

However, Netwealth now offers wholesale investors the opportunity to purchase unlisted bonds with lower minimum investment amounts through IAM who are a specialist bond broker. IAM is an ASX listed group that delivers a complete income investment service providing investors, advisors and portfolio managers with a modern platform, including research and execution to manage income investments. With over 14 years of specialised industry experience and more than 3 billion in assets under administration, IAM covers a broad spectrum of income investments including cash deposits, bonds, asset management and treasury management services.

Given the innovative new Netwealth small parcel bond service, we thought it would be a great opportunity to have Craig Swanger from IAM join us on today's podcast. Craig is a director and chief investment officer of IAM and has more than 25 years experience in investment markets, including being the global head of Macquarie's Global Investment Unit. He's a highly regarded FinTech investment and strategy expert. Craig has built businesses in 14 countries across funds management, wealth, insurance, and banking, and advises and invests in a portfolio of 12 high growth companies from early stage and rapidly scaling FinTech companies.

Craig's recently developed his macroeconomic views on what investors can expect over the course of this year, and a particular area of focus has been China. Given this specialised knowledge, I thought we would focus today's podcast on the China's economy and particularly why Craig believes interest rates will fall faster than general consensus expects as China moves to support economic growth that we'll see it export inflation. This is a really interesting macroeconomic observation given we have all been recipients of China exporting deflation to the developed world for the last 30 years or so.

Recent mainstream media retention has focused on whether the strains in China's property market and mounting debt will lead to a significant economic turn down. So investors are focused on whether a soft landing can be navigated. I'll touch on this topic today and particularly Craig's view on China starting to export inflation which will have a bigger impact on the developed world than the Chinese property market slowdown.

Having said that, the World Bank projects China's GDP growth to slow down in 2024 to about 4.5% compared to 5.2% in 2023. This slowdown is attributed to factors like a weak real estate sector and sluggish global demand, but the World Bank projection is still a healthy GDP growth rate for the year. Craig, thanks for joining us this morning and can you start by telling the listeners a bit about the growth of the IAM business and your role as the chief investment officer?

Craig Swanger:

Yeah. Thanks very much Paul, and thanks for the invite. I was chief investment Officer at Macquarie Group back in around crossing over the time of the global financial crisis. And one of the things that we really learned from that was the power of strategic asset allocation and the difficulty that particularly in Australia, unlike the other 13 or so countries that we worked in, Australia investors really suffer from not being able to invest, particularly in corporate bonds and making a couple of quick distinctions there. One is it's very easy to invest in fixed interest in Australia. You can invest in government fixed interest or semi-government fixed interest, but corporate bonds fall into a difficult category and it's largely just for various historic and infrastructure reasons that have meant that the minimum parcel size to invest in a corporate bond is $500,000. So that would mean to have a somewhat diversified portfolio of say 10 corporate bonds, you would need $5 million, well beyond the reach of most people.

So I started while at Macquarie looking at various ways for people to be able to invest in smaller parcel sizes in corporate bonds and found actually even back then, and this is 2013, so this is after the global financial crisis, there were really only two or three different options and that remains the case today. So it means for investors in Australia, accessing corporate bonds in particular has been and remains a big challenge. If you want to have a diversified portfolio of say 10 corporate bonds, you need $5 million and that's well beyond the reach of most Australian investors. Similarly, you need to ensure that at the time you want to either buy or sell those bonds, there is trading liquidity, you have access to those. Those two things, smaller parcel size and also having that trading liquidity are really only available from two or three different providers in the Australian market, even today in 2024, and that really makes Australia quite unique.

One of the countries, for example, that was under my supervision was New Zealand, much, much smaller than Australia, as much as the Kiwis on the listening to this podcast would hate me to say, New Zealand is substantially smaller and yet has more of a corporate bond trading infrastructure than Australia's. When I had the chance to join the Income Asset Management Board, it was a great opportunity to then say, well, here's a chance to make a difference to the sorts of investments that Australians can make, and that's why I joined.

Paul O'Connor:

Yeah. Well, it seems to me it's really about democratising bonds and really opening up the opportunities as you've articulated there due to the high investment minimums and I guess historically, yeah, Australians have just settled for either a managed fund or an ETF to get exposure to a diversified portfolio of fixed income instrument. It's great to hear that this opportunity is opening up to Australian investors, Craig.

Craig Swanger:

That's a really succinct way of putting it. It covers on the other point, which is that for a lot of people, managed funds are a really good solution and I've always been a big believer in managed funds, but also a huge believer in the concept of as Warren Buffett says, "The substance over form." What people are looking for is the diversification and income benefits that come from corporate bonds in this case, and the form really comes down to how they've chosen to invest. It could be managed funds, could be ETFs, but for a lot of people, for a lot of different reasons, they want direct investments and it's that direct side. It's like stockbroking relates to shares. What's the equivalent in corporate bonds?

And that's the part that I really loved about the idea that Income Asset Management had was let people buy corporate bonds in the form that they want. Through funds, through ETFs, through a model portfolio, on platforms like Netwealth or just buy them directly again, on or off platform, it doesn't matter. The whole point is I want the access to the substance of the benefits of that corporate bond regardless of the form.

Paul O'Connor:

You're preaching to the converted in myself there, Craig, given the we saw, I thought that was the great opportunity of partnering up with IAM and offering this service to the small parcel bond service to our investors. So it'll be great to see how it develops over time. Moving on to the topic today for the podcast, the Chinese economies never fully recovered back to the pre-COVID GDP growth rates and seems to be slowing again. China's faced risks before, but why might this time be more of a concern for Australian investors?

Craig Swanger:

It's a great question to open the topic with because the first thing to say is that China's growth slowing as it were from 5.2 to 4.5% or whatever, the slow rate will be between 2023 and 2024. The sheer size of the Chinese economy means that that growth rate is still really impressive. Personally, I don't believe that China will actually achieve that growth rate, but even if it achieves 2 or 3% from the size that it is right now, that's still really impressive. However, investments typically are priced on the basis of their growth or other metrics that relate to the change, not the size of the investment. And that's really what worries me right now when it comes to China is that the perception of the ability of the Chinese economy to continue growing at the pace that it has out runs the reality. China is not able to keep up its growth rate that it has been in the last few years and there's a range of reasons for that.

But the single biggest challenge that they've faced in the last 20 to 25 years is the current challenge of the growth rate of residential property development. And the reason that concerns me in particular is as an Australian investor, it has both a direct and an indirect impact that far exceeds that for our peers in the OECD, particularly for Europe and the US. So to explain those points in a little bit more detail, residential property development has accounted for around about one quarter, 25% of GDP growth in China over the last 25 years. And that has largely come from a trend called urbanisation. Urbanisation is not unique to China at all. It's the same trend that saw New York grow from 3 million people to 8 million people, actually around about over 100 years ago. Now, Paris, London, Tokyo, we're all exactly the same.

Now, today the four largest cities in the world are all Chinese. The next after that is Tokyo, and then you've got cities like Mexico City or Lagos in Nigeria that are growing to be the world's largest and it'll be Delhi and Mumbai after that. Urbanisation is a trend that occurs whenever an economy starts to go from being agricultural and people live in the country to being all about or largely about manufacturing. So China has seen 25 or 30 years of this enormous urbanisation trend. When you've got over a billion people, 30% of your population, which is typically the percentage of the population that moves in an urbanisation trend, 30% of a billion is a very large number and that is the number of people that have moved to Chinese cities already.

Now here's the problem. What typically happens with urbanisation is you see around about 30% of a country's population live in the cities and it grows to 60% and then it starts to slow. There are no rules with these things, of course. It could exceed that by a bit, but it's certainly not going to ever get anywhere near 90 or 100%. China has already passed that 60% mark. So what that means is that our expectations of seeing China continue to urbanise our expectations should start to wane. At this stage, we should start to think that that urbanisation trend is slowing, and that's certainly what the data shows now is that China's urbanisation has started to slow.

However, they have continued to develop residential property as if there was still the same level of demand for new property in the cities and the same level of demand for infrastructure in the cities. And that is what is causing the current headaches for the property development sector along with a range of policy changes made out of Beijing. But the major cause is that less and less people as a percentage of the total population. Less and less people are moving to the cities. Less and less people are demanding new property, and that is causing headaches for developers because they can't sell it to people who are migrating to the cities. They're forced therefore to sell to investors more and more. And that is what's largely causing the headaches for the policymakers because the policymakers can't just tell those investors to be confident about that someone will move into their property built in the cities. When it comes to people, you need to be far more convincing and not just demand that people will continue to invest.

That's a very long way of saying residential property slowing in China is a problem, one, because it's a very human problem. You can't force people to move from the country to the city even in China. Two, you've started to exceed the natural level of demand, once there's no longer the families to move into the homes, you need investors. And three, once an investor confidence starts to wane, which it certainly has in China in the last few years, it's very, very hard to recover from that. When you're talking 25% of GDP growth, that sheer size is a really significant problem for policymakers in China. It's just too hard to replace.

Paul O'Connor:

I always get the feeling, Craig, that the Western world never really understands China. So how much of this current issue in China's Western media sensationalism versus being a real issue?

Craig Swanger:

Look, it's always healthy to be sceptical about the way that the media depicts things and to look at two or three different sources. In this case, the sensationalism if it exists, really focus on, they refer to it as ghost cities, implying that there are entire cities in which there are empty buildings and waiting for people to move into. It's not really the case in China. Yes, they have developed residential property in excess of natural demand, and you would never see that in places like Australia or you would see it less and less in places like Australia or the US because property developers would stop faster if they found the demand wasn't there.

Excessive supply relative to the demand is somewhere around about two to three years at worst. So we're not talking about entire ghost cities as the media would imply, but what we are talking about is excess demand that if we stop building right now, we would see in the base case around two years of natural demand. The people moving to the cities would soak up all of those existing built empty properties within a couple of years. That's saying that the media sensationalise it, but directionally they're correct. There are too many developed properties in China, and there are not enough people moving to the cities to absorb that no matter what you do to policy to try and increase that demand.

Paul O'Connor:

There does appear to be some signs of a partial recovery in the commercial real estate market driven by government support and a rebound in consumption. However, no doubt the overall situation in the property market remains a concern. So what are your thoughts on the extent of this Chinese property market downturn?

Craig Swanger:

So what the Chinese government has done, and to be fair, it's probably about all they can do, is they've made sure that the property developers have access to funds to complete the projects they've started. So let's say for example that works and the developers are able to borrow the money to complete the projects and the people who own those apartments find themselves with a completed product. You still need someone to move into that property in order for there to be a return on that investment. And if the level of urbanisation, the level of people moving to the cities is not high enough, then many of those properties will remain empty and there is nothing that Beijing can do. It's very, very difficult for Beijing to do enough to be able to influence that.

Yes, I think the current policy of making sure that developers have the funds to complete the current projects that will work for the next year or two at best. But if those properties aren't filled, investors won't buy the next batch and those developers won't start new projects and will start to really feel the crunch. In terms of China's GDP growth, will lose its single largest growth engine, which has been residential property development.

Paul O'Connor:

The Chinese Ministry of Finance is aiming to control government spending and reduce debt by implementing austerity measures. I note Fitch ratings recently revised the outlook on China's sovereign debt to negative due to concerns over property and public finance stress. So do you think the Chinese authorities can manage the economic growth slowdown and navigate a softer landing?

Craig Swanger:

I think they can create a softer landing, but their level of influence is limited and it's limited because you're dealing, in this case when it comes to residential property investors, you're dealing with real individual people, not corporations, and they are much harder to impact with the policy approach or the central control approach that China has used in the past. A lot of the focus around the level of debt in China, in my view, is very appropriate. Central debt in China is quite low, at around 50 to 60% of GDP. Relative to the rest of the world, that's very low. However, where China has funded most of its residential property, financial support and infrastructure spending, which of course supports residential property as well has been at the local government special purpose vehicle level, and that is in effect guaranteed by local government, which is in effect guaranteed by Beijing.

So with most countries, you need to look at the total level of debt, which is the federal level of debt plus the state or local government level of debt, any state owned enterprises, and then add that to the household sector and the non-bank finance sector to really understand how heavily geared a particular economy is. So using that as an example, Australia is famously has one of the highest levels of household debt in the world, but if you add together our state-owned enterprises, federal government, state government, local government, and that non-financial business sector, with the household sector, we come at somewhere around about 240 to 250% of GDP as a total level of debt.

China is much closer to 400%, which is about the same as Japan. It's because they have that level of local government debt on the infrastructure and the residential housing finance support. That's what's causing this very high level of indebtedness right now. And that's why the rating agencies are trying to figure out, well, how do we rate the national level of debt? How do we rate national issuance of debt when there's this implied guarantee sitting there?

Paul O'Connor:

It's interesting. I didn't realise the extent of the debt when you take in both the public and the private sector as well there, Craig. So very interesting.

Craig Swanger:

Coming back to your previous question, Paul, when it comes to the media, it's not that they're intentionally misleading the reader, but there's a lot of media talk about China's low level of indebtedness. And actually China has a level of indebtedness that is so high that yes, it's challenging Japan in terms of being the world leader indebtedness, but Japan has plenty of policy angles that they can take because most of their debt is actually owed to their own pension funds and individuals. Whereas in China's case, a lot of it is actually, or the vast majority of it's external to China. And that means that the central policy makers in China are backed into a corner and that's when things really start to get ugly for the Chinese economy overall is over the last 15 to 20 years, how do you replace a level of growth with something new without the world losing confidence in China as an economic growth engine?

Paul O'Connor:

And I guess with also China losing some level of competitiveness as an exporter given rising wages and what have you there as well, it's a real dilemma I guess, for the authorities.

Paul O'Connor:

So in terms of a China slowdown, what do you think that actually means for global markets?

Craig Swanger:

This is the big question for investors and like most things, it comes down to the two factors of perceptions and reality. The growth rate for China in my view, faces more challenges now than ever before and for all the reasons I've already talked about. So how will the world markets look at that from a perceptions point of view? My guess is that growth markets in particular, so equities, most of the commodity sector, foreign currency markets be impacted in their own way. They will have a very severe impact because China is, depending on how you measure it, is the largest or the second largest economy in the world. So if it slows down, it will definitely slow down the global economy. Hopefully they can manage a softer landing as we've talked about, but the perception of the risks that a China slowdown creates for equity markets, the perception is going to be... Well, I'm better sitting on the sidelines than they're being involved directly.

And then the second factor kicks in, which is the reality. What's China going to do about this? How are they're going to manage a softer landing and how are they going to look for other ways to grow their economy? Is it going to be from exports? Is it going to be a particular sector or are they going to be able to manage this residential property development slowdown in a way that means they buy themselves a few years and come out the other side being hypercompetitive as they always have been before?

Paul O'Connor:

So then from a portfolio construction perspective, how do you think Australian investors should be reacting to this?

Craig Swanger:

Look, there's two factors for Aussie investors. The first is the direct impact. The one that really concerns me the most is the iron ore price. About 36% of Australia's exports specifically relate to the export of iron ore to China, and it's an enormous figure. But in reverse, around 69% of China's imports of iron ore come from Australia. So whichever way you look at it, there is a high level of dependency. Australia is very dependent for export the dollar value of its export growth. It's very dependent on China, and China is very dependent on Australia for iron ore. Iron ore is incredibly important for residential property development, both in terms of the houses and or units themselves, but also for the infrastructure. So China has been, for example, in the recent fights between Canberra and Beijing, iron ore was excluded from any of the discussions around tariff controls and other pricing controls that Beijing could enforce on Australia.

As an Australian investor, how do I insulate myself? How do I protect myself from not being exposed should there be a sudden drop in the iron ore price? Well, it's reasonably obvious is you don't buy into any of the companies, whether it's through equities or corporate debt, you don't buy yourself into those cash flows. Fortescue is a great example, but BHP and Rio both have a very high exposure to iron ore as well, but the indirect is much harder. And the indirect, a lot of it relates to perceptions. So Australia is seen as being what's called a high beta economy. In other words, when the world is growing strongly and confidently, Australia is perceived to be in a great position and that's because partly we are a commodity-driven economy. But secondly actually when there's more discretionary income globally, areas like tourism and education and health benefit, so both our services and our product sector benefit when the world's growing strongly.

On the flip side, if the perceptions change and the growth outlook for the world falls, then the perceptions of the prospects for Australia really start to fall as well. And that's the indirect knock-on effect is if the world suddenly wakes up and decides that the growth story in China is coming to an end, what will be the impact on Australian asset prices? How far will they fall and when will we switch over from the fear perception cycle into more of the reality of, well, what is the impact of China slowing down and how much does that really impact investors in Australia, and which sectors specifically?

I would say firstly, if you're concerned about China's growth story, take a very close look at the commodity exposure that you've got, particularly iron ore. Iron ore and copper are the two commodities that are very heavily linked to China and the rest of them actually relatively diversified. So not as much a concern, but take a close look at that. Secondly, take a close look at regional assets. That might be banks that have lend a lot more into WA, Queensland and to a lesser extent into South Australia because they're going to be far more exposed to China. And thirdly, anything Australian will certainly during that perception phase will get a very close level of consideration by global investors and Australian equities for example, will probably not do as well as equities around the world in that downturn.

Paul O'Connor:

Yeah. Well, I guess as you are making your observations there about the impact on portfolio construction, I'm thinking specifically about significant, I guess changes to strategic asset allocation and the type of strategy investors are allocating to in their portfolio, i.e, reducing exposure to a hard commodities and potentially the ASX going through a more prolonged period of underperformance compared to the developed world share markets too. So it's quite profound this change as I think as you're articulating there, Craig. In terms of potentially even reducing exposure to equities and maybe taking risk out of a portfolio, I guess at the end of the day most people would think that will lead to lowering returns. So do you think that is the case? So are we in for a longer period of lower returns?

Craig Swanger:

No, look, I don't necessarily think so. And this is why I really focus my role around overall asset allocation because all investors or every investor has a different need for things like growth rates, need for income and need for capital growth appreciation. So everyone's going to have a different outlook. I've always had the view that the reason we have strategic asset allocation is so that you can embed the sorts of overall beliefs about world growth, about particular sector growth, about particular thematics, and then come up with an asset allocation to suit that. I think there'll be lower growth rates in certain growth markets like certain sectors of the equity cycle. I think it's fair. You mentioned before when we talk about people's, how they allocate the money between different asset classes. The other big change I think in certainly 2024, '25 and the next few years is that there'll be more demand, more importance placed on active asset selection than there is than has been in the past.

That's good news if you're a fund manager, but if you're an investor, if you're a real person, the message there is, you don't throw away all of your equity, you don't throw away all of your bonds or all of your property, nor do you throw all of your money into one of those sectors. You start looking for what are the thematics that are going to drive prices and make sure that you're not sitting in front of a risk that could get ahead of you. And I think China is one of those where the risk of a Chinese slowdown, firstly, it can be quantified in the way that we've talked about already today, but it's also very hard to understand the risks of China when the central government operates so differently. The economy operates so differently to what we're used to in a viable level of risk. And for a lot of people it means don't get exposed to that level of risk when you can't quantify what it is and you don't really understand what the level of returns might be.

Paul O'Connor:

You've mentioned some areas of caution going forward for investors like exposure to iron ore and the potential impact on Western Australia and Queensland from a slowing Chinese economy, but I guess it'll also have a reasonably profound impact on the AUD, the value of the AUD. And I guess thinking ahead, I'm thinking what that then means for hedging and unhedging your offshore assets in a portfolio. So I'm assuming from the takeout you would be leaning towards more unhedged exposures for offshore assets.

Craig Swanger:

It's an interesting question because... So I won't answer the question around whether I personally prefer hedged or unhedged directly because it does really depend on where an individual sees their liabilities. If we're going to travel a lot, for example, I'm going to spend my time travelling the world on one of those big cruise ships, then I'm probably more likely to want to hedge the currency risk and make sure I'm not exposed to a falling AUD. One of the things that I encourage all investors to look at, particularly when they do have a high level of offshore future spending is to really understand that the way that you invest, what you choose to invest in, whether that's equities or bonds or property and how much exposure you choose to have to the Australian dollar, then they're not linked to each other. Don't make asset class decisions based on currency.

So for example, I can invest in international shares and leave it unhedged and therefore be effectively short the Australian dollar. And I can do exactly the same thing with corporate bonds and I can do the same thing with property for that matter. It's a little harder, but it's possible where I invest in a US dollar corporate bond or property or share and don't hedge that back into Australian dollars, I can get the same level of risk, the same level of income, but I can at the same time have myself exposed to a currency that's offshore.

The other way to answer that question is be more direct about it and say your premise at the start, Paul was exactly right to say that if that outlook is right around China and particularly around iron ore and the exports of our commodities. If that outlook's right, it's not good news for the Australian dollar. So that would mean that the Aussie potentially falls even from its relatively low levels now. Into the fifties, if I'm an investor that's left myself unhedged to the Australian dollar, so in other words I'm exposed to the US dollar or Euro, then I'm quite likely to benefit from that.

Paul O'Connor:

So what areas of the market make sense to you at the moment and where there could be potential opportunity?

Craig Swanger:

I think this is we're entering into a period of relatively high uncertainty. It's difficult to understand the level of risk that China creates because we haven't had that life experience ourselves and economists and fund managers are famous at looking backwards. They're all looking to the past to try and draw a picture of the future. And we've never seen an economy of the sheer scale and its controlled and centrally controlled model. We've never seen that before. So I'm not a believer in looking backwards to go forwards. I would much sooner say there are some sectors of the economy, some sectors of investments I will not understand. And therefore if I'm investing in those sectors, I'm doing so more on faith than I am on investment fundamentals, so it's highly unlikely I'm going to be investing there. This approach that the EFR would suggest is which sectors do we understand well?

And contrary to popular belief, contrary to the media, while Australia is heavily exposed to China, if China were to dramatically slow down, once the dust settles, once markets get over themselves and realise that the reality is not as bad as the perception, Australia is actually in a very, very strong position because the sectors that are heavily linked to the health of the Chinese economy are limited even within the mining sector, for example, limited around iron ore and copper in particular. But property development, finance, the service sector, these are not sectors that are heavily exposed to a China slowdown. The flip side of a China slowdown is what does that mean for other economies around the world? Who's going to step into their place? I grew up in a time in which Japanese was a compulsory language in high school because according to common belief, Japan was going to take over the world. By the time I finished high school, Japan had gone into recession and it turned out to be a huge waste of time.

There's nothing stopping China. In fact, it's following a very specific pass of the proverbial lost decade that Japan faced. And there's nothing stopping China from going into 10 or 20 years of slowdown and someone else steps in their place. In my view, that would be India. Okay. Well, what's India short on? They're short on energy. They're extremely short on being able to produce enough energy to sustain that level of growth. They're a service economy driven model. So it's different to what China would be. And India is by far not than the only choice that people have. There's also large segments of places like Pakistan, Mexico, and then of course there's Africa as well.

All of which is to say that the sectors worth investing in, the sectors worth avoiding actually is probably the better place to start, are limited to the ones that are too heavily exposed to China. Iron ore and copper are the two to avoid, but actually much of the rest of the sectors really are in a very strong position and that really drives... You asked before the question of, but does investing to suit the theme mean lower returns? Not necessarily. It means having a really good understanding of what level of risk I'm taking. Avoiding sectors that I do not understand the risk in and backing those sectors that are going to do well under this environment in which China does slow down.

Paul O'Connor:

Yeah. And I think all wise comments there, Craig, in terms of how we all reflect on our strategic asset allocation. And I think the observation I will make listening to your comments there is, whilst China may not be creating or be the contributor that global GDP growth that it has been over the last 30 years, there will always be other opportunity. And I think I share your optimism on areas like India for example, and I think India is a lot easier for us Westerners to understand given the rule of law and democracy also in that country there.

We'll call it in to the podcast there, Craig, but it's been a really fascinating discussion about your views on China and the move there. I think from exporting deflation to potentially exporting inflation going forward and what impact its property market slowdown will have, not only on China's GDP growth rate, but also on the world there. And I think it gives all of us and all of the podcast listeners some really good insights to reflect on in our own portfolios and how we manage our asset allocation there. So thank you very much for joining us this morning there, Craig. And it's great to hear from yourself and the update on Income Asset Management, the business and how the business is also democratising bonds and corporate bonds in terms of making them available to investors. So I thank you for the time and your insights, Craig.

Craig Swanger:

Thanks very much, Paul.

Paul O'Connor:

And to the listeners, thank you very much again for joining us on instalment of the Netwealth Portfolio Construction Podcast series. I hope you enjoyed the discussion with Craig as much as I have, and I'll look forward to you joining us on the next instalment of the podcast. So have a great day everyone, and all the best. Cheers.